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DOES CRYPTOCURRENCY STAKING FALL
UNDER SEC JURISDICTION?
Nicholas E. Gonzalez*
ABSTRACT
Bitcoin, the first blockchain and cryptocurrency (crypto), launched in
2009 when the Bitcoin network opened to the public. A blockchain is
a digital ledger technology where transactions are aggregated and
permanently recorded into blocks of information. Maintenance of a
blockchain is typically conducted by decentralized managers who
own and operate network computers (“Nodes”) and serve the
functions normally handled by central intermediaries to validate and
confirm transactions. All Nodes follow a blockchain protocol. In
Bitcoin’s and most cryptos’ cases, this protocol is known as a Proofof-Work protocol which requires a large amount of energy
consumption. Consequently, Proof-of-Stake protocols (“PoS”) were
introduced into crypto blockchains as a solution to the power
consumption problem.
In light of the advancement of blockchain technology, many have
postulated whether PoS validation, a practice known as “Staking,”
poses regulatory risks for Node Managers. Although a robust
regulatory regime is far from complete, several federal agencies have
engaged with the topic of crypto as early as 2014. The Securities and
Exchange Commission, the agency that regulates investment
contracts, is one of them. Under the Supreme Court’s Howey and
Marine Bank Tests, which interpret the Securities Act of 1933, an
investment contract is “a contract, transaction, or scheme whereby a
person invests her money in a common enterprise and is led to expect
profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party.” Staking
arrangements involve individual investors contributing crypto to
Staking pools with the expectation of receiving a reward while relying
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on the efforts of the pool’s Node Manager. A court using the Howey
and Marine Bank analyses would find Staking arrangements are
investment contracts. Fortunately, developers and Node Managers can
charge flat fees, disincentivize large pools, and implement delegation
to escape such regulatory classification and scrutiny.
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I. INTRODUCTION
From Bitcoin to non-fungible tokens (“NFTs”), blockchain-based
digital assets have risen in popularity over the past decade, and
increasingly so as the Covid-19 pandemic spurred a new population of
investors.1 The discussion of digital assets is far from quiet, with
headlines about the topic popping up every day, in both industry and
mainstream sources.2 The market is also quite large; for example, in
March 2021, the digital artist known as Beeple sold a digital photo linked
to a blockchain as a NFT for $69 million.3 With a market capitalization
reaching over $1 trillion and trading volume reaching $1.4 billion for
Bitcoin alone, it is fair to say blockchain-based digital assets are in the
mainstream.4
The rising popularity of blockchain-based digital assets like
cryptocurrency (crypto) has forced regulatory agencies, such as the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), to interpret longstanding
laws quickly and comprehensively. While cryptos were classified as
commodities like gold or oil by the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC),5 new technologies continuously compel regulators
to evaluate whether cryptos fit under different classifications. “Staking”
is one of the new technologies to find itself in the agencies’ sights, so
1. Gregory Sirico, Tales from the Crypto, BEST LAWS. (July 13, 2021, 8:00 AM),
https://www.bestlawyers.com/article/cryptocurrency-on-rise-during-covid-19/3787
[https://perma.cc/B9P2-2UVG].
2. Peter Santilli et al., From Bitcoin to Dogecoin: What’s Driving
Cryptocurrencies’ Rise and the Challenges Ahead, WALL ST. J. (May 17, 2021),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-factors-driving-crypto-markets-boom-and-thechallenges-ahead-11621243809 [https://perma.cc/M8CF-356R].
3. Jacob Kastrenakes, Beeple Sold an NFT for $69 Million, VERGE (Mar. 11, 2021),
https://www.theverge.com/2021/3/11/22325054/beeple-christies-nft-sale-costeverydays-69-million [https://perma.cc/4TT5-YL55].
4. Market Capitalization (USD), BLOCKCHAIN, https://www.blockchain.com/
charts/market-cap [https://perma.cc/KR4E-DRJQ].
5. See Coinflip, Inc., CFTC Docket No. 15-29, CFTC, https://www.cftc.gov/
sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/legalpleading/en
fcoinfliprorder09172015.pdf [https://perma.cc/NL44-PRM3] (“Bitcoin and other virtual
currencies are encompassed in the [commodity] definition and properly defined as
commodities.”) (last accessed July 2, 2022). See also, Press Release, Commodity Futures
Trading Comm’n, In Case You Missed It: Chairman Tarbert Comments on
Cryptocurrency Regulation at Yahoo! Finance All Markets Summit (Oct. 10, 2019),
https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/8051-19 [https://perma.cc/X573-66E6].
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much so that both SEC Chair, Gary Gensler, and former CFTC Chairman,
Heath P. Tarbert, have publicly discussed its likelihood of falling under
SEC jurisdiction.6 Staking is the process by which investors of a particular
crypto are given rewards, typically newly minted crypto and transaction
fees, in exchange for locking up their crypto within a blockchain protocol
over a given period.7
The SEC regulates investment contracts and is the most well
equipped to grapple with Staking. The SEC’s mission is to “protect
investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate
capital formation.”8 The SEC uses the Supreme Court’s Howey Test to
determine whether a given contract, transaction, or scheme is an
investment contract.9 Under Howey, an investment contract is defined as
“an investment of money in a common enterprise with profits to come
solely from the efforts of others.”10 Here, Staking arrangements involve
investors contributing crypto with the expectation of receiving a reward.
While the SEC has yet to speak definitively on the topic, debates
regarding how Staking should be classified have emerged around the
blockchain community.11 Advocates of stronger regulation reason the
practice of Staking looks more like an investment contract than typical
6. Interview by David Ignatius with Garry Gensler, Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n (Sept. 21, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/washington-post-live/2021/
09/21/transcript-path-forward-cryptocurrency-with-gary-gensler/ [https://perma.cc/5G4
D-TGAS]. See also Nikhilesh De, CFTC Chairman Heath Tarbert Talks Ethereum, Defi
and the Next BitMEX, COINDESK (Oct. 14, 2020, 3:25 PM), https://www.coindesk.com/
policy/2020/10/14/cftc-chairman-heath-tarbert-talks-ethereum-defi-and-the-next-bitmex
[https://perma.cc/L4ZB-HGAJ].
7. What is Staking?, COINBASE, https://www.coinbase.com/learn/crypto-basics/
what-is-staking [https://perma.cc/STV6-7L3C] (last visited Feb. 19, 2022).
8. What We Do, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Nov. 22, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/
about/what-we-do [https://perma.cc/LD6H-Q9P8].
9. See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946); Framework
for “Investment Contracts” Analysis of Digital Assets, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Apr.
3, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/corpfin/framework-investment-contract-analysis-digitalassets [https://perma.cc/A5MJ-KSWJ]; Jacqueline Hennelly, The Cryptic Nature of
Crypto Digital Assets Regulations: The Ripple Lawsuit and Why the Industry Needs
Regulatory Clarity, 27 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 259, 262 (2022).
10. Howey, 328 U.S. at 301.
11. Darren J. Sandler, Citrus Groves in the Cloud: Is Cryptocurrency Cloud Mining
A Security?, 34 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 250, 279-80 (2018). See also Securities
Law Considerations for Staking Services, BLOCKCHAIN ASS’N, https://theblockchain
association.org/securities-law-considerations-for-staking-services [https://perma.cc/VU
5G-NPA2] (last visited Feb. 19, 2022).
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blockchain validation practices and should, therefore, be regulated.12
Proponents of free crypto markets contend that Staking is not an
investment contract because the practice of Staking fails the Howey
Test.13 Crypto exchanges further contend they have repeatedly asked the
SEC for guidance but are given the cold shoulder, making it impossible
to know what regulations to follow.14
This Note addresses whether Staking arrangements should qualify as
investment contracts under securities law. Part II provides a background
of cryptos, Staking, and Proof-of-Stake protocols. Part III explores
whether a Proof-of-Stake protocol exposes cryptos to regulatory hurdles.
Part IV argues that Staking falls within the existing regulatory framework
for investment contracts, as well as provides solutions for how crypto
developers can mitigate the consequent regulatory risks. Part V
summarizes this Note and provides a forward outlook.
II. BLOCKCHAIN AND THE EVOLUTION TO PROOF-OF-STAKE
PROTOCOLS
A. BLOCKCHAIN, CRYPTO, AND PROOF-OF-WORK PROTOCOLS
Crypto is a virtual currency based on blockchain technology that is
secured by cryptography, the most popular being Bitcoin.15 Bitcoin, the
first blockchain and crypto, launched in 2009 when the Bitcoin network
opened to the public.16 Bitcoins, like most cryptos, have no tangible
existence, no centralized bank, and are not backed by a governmental
authority.17 Instead, they are balances in a digital ledger, controlled by
digital keys (passcodes), and stored in digital wallets (computer software)

12.
13.
14.

Sandler, supra note 11.
Securities Law Considerations for Staking Services, supra note 11.
Matt Levine, Lending Bitcoins is Tricky, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 8, 2021, 12:56 PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2021-09-08/lending-bitcoins-is-tricky.
15. Jake Frankenfield, WHAT IS CRYPTOCURRENCY? INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.
investopedia.com/terms/c/cryptocurrency.asp [https://perma.cc/6B78-525P] (last visited
May 2, 2022).
16. Paulina Likos & Coryanne Hicks, The History of Bitcoin, the First
Cryptocurrency, U.S. NEWS (Feb. 4, 2022), https://money.usnews.com/investing/articles/
the-history-of-bitcoin [https://perma.cc/SD3G-XPF6].
17. Julia Finch, From Silk Road to ATMs: The History of Bitcoin, GUARDIAN
(Sept. 14, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/sep/13/from-silk-roadto-atms-the-history-of-bitcoin [https://perma.cc/HNU3-SD55].
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that exist on either an investor’s local device or online with a wallet
service provider.18 Once stored, cryptos can be transferred to other wallets
directly or traded for other currencies through crypto exchanges.19 All of
these transactions are recorded on the given crypto blockchain.20
Blockchain is a technology involving a digital ledger within which
transactions are aggregated and permanently recorded into blocks, that
are subsequently added in chronological order creating a chain.21 The
blockchain operates through a network of computers (“Nodes”) that
records, verifies, and distributes the ledger according to a specific
computer programming code known as a “protocol.”22 Typically, the
more decentralized a blockchain network is, by distributing and
replicating the digital ledger on each Node, the more valuable it is. This
is because decentralization eliminates a central point of failure, which
ensures the network is fraud free and continuously operational.23
The blockchain is maintained by decentralized managers who own
and operate Nodes (“Node Managers”) and serve the functions normally
handled by central intermediaries.24 Each Node is a validator on the
network that not only stores a copy of the ledger but also monitors the
18. Andrey Sergeenkov, What is Bitcoin?, COINDESK, https://www.coindesk.com/
learn/what-is-bitcoin/ [https://perma.cc/N2K2-Q7W5] (last visited Apr. 13, 2022). See
also Carol Goforth, The Lawyer’s Cryptionary: A Resource for Talking to Clients About
Crypto-Transactions, 41 CAMPBELL L. REV. 47, 58 (2019).
19. Kendall Little, Want to Buy Crypto? Here’s What to Look for In a Crypto
Exchange, TIME (Apr. 18, 2022), https://time.com/nextadvisor/investing/cryptocurrency/
what-are-cryptocurrency-exchanges/ [https://perma.cc/YBG7-2QJD].
20. Jake Frankenfield, Block (Bitcoin Block), INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.
investopedia.com/terms/b/block-bitcoin-block.asp [https://perma.cc/K5FK-YF4T] (last
updated, Jan. 9, 2022).
21. Id.
22. See generally Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash
System (unpublished manuscript, 2009), https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf [https://perma.cc/
BXM4-ANVF]; Crypto Glossary - Cryptopedia, GEMINI, https://www.gemini.com/
cryptopedia/glossary [https://perma.cc/63F3-RKMS] (last visited May 2, 2022).
23. Sander, supra note 11, at 254.
24. Jordan Tuwiner, What is Bitcoin Mining and How Does it Work?, BUY BITCOIN
WORLDWIDE, https://www.buybitcoinworldwide.com/mining [https://perma.cc/DZ377PTX] (explaining that Bitcoin miners solve “a computational problem which allows
them to chain together blocks of transactions”) (last updated Feb. 11, 2022); Bitcoin
Nodes vs. Miners: Demystified, BRAIINS, https://braiins.com/blog/bitcoin-nodes-vsminers-demystified#:~:text=Ultimately%2C%20miners%20must%20play%20by,true%
20rulers%20of%20the%20network [https://perma.cc/779M-SAMG] (last visited Apr.
13, 2022).
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network for newly-announced transactions.25 All Nodes follow a
blockchain consensus protocol to accomplish the recording, validation,
and distribution process.26 In Bitcoin’s and most cryptos’ cases, this
protocol is a Proof-of-Work protocol (“PoW”).27 In PoW, a transaction is
reported to the network, after which each Node examines its copy of the
digital ledger to ensure the transaction is legitimate; this is done by
verifying that, based on transaction history, a given wallet has the
requisite crypto to transfer.28 Once verified, the transaction is aggregated
with other transactions for “miners” to form a potential block in the
chain.29
Miners are network contributors who own and operate specialized
Nodes.30 Miners receive the aggregated transactions and compete by
performing “work” to confirm transactions and secure the network for the
chance to record all new entries into the block.31 For this chance, however,
miners must solve a mathematical proof presented by the previous block,
often by guessing the solution.32 Once guessed, the solution is sent back
to the Nodes for verification, after which the winning miner is granted the
right to record the block and is rewarded with newly minted crypto and
transaction fees for their efforts.33
While Bitcoin and PoW are known for their originality,
transparency, and security, unfortunately their energy cost is larger than

25. Andrey Sergeenkov, What is Bitcoin?, COINDESK, https://www.coindesk.com/
learn/what-is-bitcoin/ [https://perma.cc/2W22-XT3T] (last visited Apr. 13, 2022). See
also, Tuwiner, supra note 24 (explaining that “[m]iners, like full nodes, maintain . . . and
monitor the network for newly-announced transactions”).
26. Sergeenkov, supra note 25.
27. What is “Proof of Work” or “Proof of Stake”?, COINBASE, https://www.
coinbase.com/learn/crypto-basics/what-is-proof-of-work-or-proof-of-stake
[https://perma.cc/LZ3R-GBUF] (last visited Jan. 21, 2022).
28. Goforth, supra note 18, at 64.
29. Id.
30. Bitcoin Nodes vs. Miners: Demystified, supra note 24.
31. Goforth, supra note 18, at 64 (explaining that “a miner then performs work in an
attempt to fit all new, valid transactions into the current block”). See Jake Frankenfield,
Proof of Work (POW), INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/proofwork.asp#citation-2 [https://perma.cc/3SKG-LMEA] (last updated July 22, 2021).
32. See What is “Proof of Work” or “Proof of Stake”?, COINBASE, https://www.
coinbase.com/learn/crypto-basics/what-is-proof-of-work-or-proof-of-stake
[https://perma.cc/727V-SC7F] (last visited Jan. 21, 2022).
33. Goforth, supra note 18, at 64.
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that of other transaction systems.34 If the Bitcoin network was a country,
its annual energy consumption would range between that of Thailand and
Vietnam.35 This large footprint is due to the significant amount of
electricity required to validate and confirm transactions.36 A single
Bitcoin transaction is equivalent to the carbon footprint of 2,302,133 Visa
transactions or to the electricity consumed by an average U.S. household
over 70 days.37 Although Bitcoin is the most popular crypto, over 9,000
different cryptos are in circulation that require similar energy needs.38
PoW is often blamed for the high energy consumption.39 In PoW, a
security feature called “Difficulty” protects the network from being
spammed, controlled, or attacked by miners seeking to alter the
blockchain.40 Difficulty is the complexity of the mathematical proof that
miners must guess to record a block.41 PoW increases the proof’s
Difficulty as the number of miners increases, which translates into greater
competition among miners and greater energy costs.42 In popular cryptos
like Bitcoin, which has an estimated 1 million miners, the Difficulty has
increased dramatically since its launch and so has the energy cost.43
34. See Bitcoin Energy Consumption Index, DIGICONOMIST, https://digiconomist.
net/bitcoin-energy-consumption [https://perma.cc/YQ6Q-M4RN] (noting that a single
bitcoin transaction is equivalent to the carbon footprint of 2,302,133 VISA transactions)
(last visited Jan. 22, 2022).
35. Id. See also Comparisons, CAMBRIDGE BITCOIN ELEC. CONSUMPTION INDEX
(CBECI), https://ccaf.io/cbeci/index/comparisons [https://perma.cc/KW5F-GGQ2] (last
visited Jan. 23, 2022).
36. Bitcoin Energy Consumption Index, supra note 34.
37. Id.
38. See COINMARKETCAP, https://coinmarketcap.com/ [https://perma.cc/8CAAYHXT] (last visited Jan. 22, 2022). See also Examining Regulatory Frameworks for
Digital Currencies and Blockchain: Hearing Before the S. Comm. On Banking, Hous., &
Urban Affairs, 116th Cong. 2 (2019) (statement of Rebecca Nelson, Specialist in
International Trade and Finance) (“[Bitcoin is the] most well-known and widely used
cryptocurrency, accounting for 65 [percent] of the [cryptocurrency] market.”).
39. See Audrey Carroll, The Other Side of the (Bit)coin: Solutions for the United
States to Mitigate the Energy Consumption of Cryptocurrency, 12 GEO. WASH. J. ENERGY
& ENV’T. L. 53, 55 (2021).
40. Jake Frankenfield, What is Cryptocurrency Difficulty?, INVESTOPEDIA, https://
www.investopedia.com/terms/d/difficulty-cryptocurrencies.asp [https://perma.cc/6Z78B9H4] (last updated July 26, 2021).
41. Id.
42. Sandler, supra note 11, at 258.
43. Bitcoin Energy Consumption Index, supra note 34. See also Comparisons, supra
note 35; Sandler, supra note 11, at 258.
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The Proof-of-Stake protocol (“PoS”) was introduced as a solution
to the power consumption problem.44 PoS is estimated to use 99 percent
less energy than PoW, as well as reduce the need for ever more expensive
and powerful mining Nodes.45 PoS is an important alternative for crypto
to increase energy efficiency and reduce waste.46 This is why Ethereum,
the developer of the second most popular crypto, Ether, has started the
switch to PoS.47 Ether is not alone, as around 10 of the 50 largest cryptos
use PoS including Cardano, Solana, and Polkadot.48
B. PROOF-OF-STAKE PROTOCOLS
1. Mechanics of Proof-of-Stake
First theorized on Bitcoin forums in July 2011, PoS varies
substantially from PoW in its consensus mechanics.49 In contrast to PoW,
where miner Nodes must successfully guess the solution to a
mathematical proof, PoS only requires that Nodes lock up crypto and
validate transactions (Stake) to obtain the chance to record the next
block.50 Staking is the process whereby investors store and lock up their
crypto in digital wallets and operate a Node, which validates transactions
to obtain newly minted crypto and transaction fees.51 Further unlike PoW,
where miners must compete to record blocks, in PoS, validator Nodes
44. Jake Frankenfield, Proof of Stake Definition, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.
investopedia.com/terms/p/proof-stake-pos.asp [https://perma.cc/X24G-HCJ5] (last
updated Dec. 17, 2021).
45. Carroll, supra note 39, at 57.
46. Id. at 55.
47. See Proof-of-Stake (POS), ETHEREUM, https://ethereum.org/en/developers/docs/
consensus-mechanisms/pos/ [https://perma.cc/5EYT-5D28] (last visited Jan. 22, 2022).
48. See COINMARKETCAP, supra note 38 (filter by “algorithm,” “PoS,” and
“DPoS”); Top 20+ Proof-of-Stake Coins & Tokens by Market Cap, COINCODEX,
https://coincodex.com/cryptocurrencies/sector/proof-of-stake/ [https://perma.cc/N8L5HDVU] (last visited Feb. 6, 2022); Pos Archives, CRYPTOSLATE, https://cryptoslate.
com/cryptos/proof-of-stake/ [https://perma.cc/3H87-VKS5] (last visited Feb. 6, 2022).
49. Cryptopedia Staff, Proof of Stake vs. Delegated Proof of Stake, GEMINI,
https://www.gemini.com/cryptopedia/proof-of-stake-delegated-pos-dpos#sectionhistory-of-po-s [https://perma.cc/DX7U-WRXR] (last updated Dec. 3, 2021).
50. Proof-of-stake (POS), supra note 47.
51. Samuel Becker, Guide to Crypto Staking: What It Is, How It Works, and How to
Get Started, SOFI (Oct. 22, 2021), https://www.sofi.com/learn/content/crypto-staking/
[https://perma.cc/LA6E-749G].
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(Nodes that satisfy the lock-up requirement) are randomly assigned the
recording right.52 Without miners competing to guess the mathematical
proof, PoS drastically reduces energy consumption and electronic waste. 53
This lock-up requirement also acts as collateral against which PoS can
penalize Nodes for improper validation or malicious behavior.54
Generally, the larger the number of crypto Staked by a given Node, the
greater the Node’s chance of recording the next block and receiving the
newly minted crypto and transaction fees.55 This incentivizes aggregating
and Staking large pools of crypto under the umbrella of one Node.56
Several PoS variations are used to determine which Node is assigned
the right to record the next block.57 As discussed above, the typical
method is based on the size of the particular Node’s Stake. Alternatively,
some protocols employ a lottery system between classes of Stake sizes to
ensure fairness and wider distribution of newly minted crypto.58 Others
randomize this right based on the length of time a given number of crypto
has been Staked.59 In this last variation, crypto must be Staked for a
minimum period to qualify as a validator Node; once the right is granted
the counter resets.60 In these cases, larger and older sets of Staked cryptos
have a greater opportunity to receive the right to record the next block.61
Another variation includes designated Nodes running specific software
(“Master Nodes”) that Stake a larger amount than others and facilitate
instant transactions, private transactions, and decentralized governance

52. Proof of Stake FAQs, ETHEREUM WIKI, https://eth.wiki/en/concepts/proof-ofstake-faqs [https://perma.cc/XJD6-M2B7] (last visited Jan. 22, 2022).
53. Proof-of-stake (POS), supra note 47.
54. Id.; Proof-of-stake (POS), supra note 47.
55. Id.; What is Proof-of-Stake?, COINDESK (Mar. 9, 2022, 3:47 PM), https://www.
coindesk.com/learn/2020/12/30/what-is-proof-of-stake/ [https://perma.cc/23AS-SJTC].
56. Ameer Rosic, Proof of Work vs Proof of Stake: Basic Mining Guide,
BLOCKGEEKS (June 19, 2020), https://blockgeeks.com/guides/proof-of-work-vs-proofof-stake/ [https://perma.cc/NH9G-GCK6]; What is Proof-of-Stake?, supra note 55.
57. Sandler, supra note 11, at 259.
58. Id. (citing Nxt Whitepaper, Revision 4, NXT (July 12, 2014), https://nxtdocs.
jelurida.com/Nxt_Whitepaper [https://perma.cc/V4MN-A262] (NXT is a protocol that
uses a proof-of-stake lottery)).
59. Id. (citing Sunny King & Scott Nadal, PPCoin: Peer-to-Peer Crypto-Currency
with Proof-of-Stake, PEERCOIN (Aug. 19, 2012), https://www.peercoin.net/ [https://
perma.cc/4J53-UYZ9]).
60. Id.
61. Id.
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voting.62 Master Nodes further enhance stability and network loyalty by
aggregating and centralizing transactions.63
A further PoS variation is known as Delegated PoS. Used by cryptos
like Cardano64 and TRON,65 Delegated PoS allows investors to lock-up
their crypto and elect delegates to record the next block on their behalf
rather than Staking themselves.66 Typically, blockchains limit the number
of delegates allowed to Stake for a given block.67 If the delegate wins the
vote and records the block, the newly minted crypto and transaction fees
are shared with investors who voted for that delegate.68 Similar to typical
PoS, the greater the Stake (in this case, the number of votes) the higher
the reward share.69 According to proponents, this is more democratic than
traditional PoS because delegates must earn a reputation for operating
quality Nodes.70
2. Proof-of-Stake Incentives
The value of crypto is its decentralized nature.71 For crypto to be
decentralized, developers must incorporate incentives for Node Managers
to build and operate the network.72 While the main incentive for Node
62. Colin Harper, What Are Masternodes? An Introduction and Guide, COIN CENT.
(Dec. 19, 2017), https://coincentral.com/what-are-masternodes-an-introduction-andguide/ [https://perma.cc/TT59-6PNF].
63. Id.
64. Stake Pool Delegation, CARDANO, https://cardano.org/stake-pool-delegation/
[https://perma.cc/BJ8K-YMDK] (last visited Feb. 9, 2022).
65. TRON, ADVANCED DECENTRALIZED BLOCKCHAIN PLATFORM 10 (2018)
https://tron.network/static/doc/white_paper_v_2_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/TM7X-3DEK].
66. What Are Proof of Stake and Delegated Proof of Stake?, GEMINI (Dec. 3, 2021),
https://www.gemini.com/cryptopedia/proof-of-stake-delegated-pos-dpos#sectionhistory-of-po-s [https://perma.cc/CL7T-B82S].
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. See also Elliot Hill, Choosing a Stake Pool and Delegating Your Ada,
MEDIUM (Aug. 26, 2020), https://medium.com/cardanorss/choosing-a-stake-pool-anddelegating-your-ada-113d71b0963f [https://perma.cc/B4B4-92ZT].
70. What Are Proof of Stake and Delegated Proof of Stake?, supra note 66. See also
Hill, supra note 69.
71. What is Bitcoin?, COINDESK, https://www.coindesk.com/learn/what-is-bitcoin/
[https://perma.cc/G78J-WCHE] (last visited Apr. 13, 2022).
72. See Bitcoin Nodes vs. Miners: Demystified, supra note 24. See also
Proof-of-Stake (POS), ETHEREUM, https://ethereum.org/en/developers/docs/consensusmechanisms/pos/ [https://perma.cc/AHV5-FDND] (last visited Apr. 14, 2022).
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Managers is the reward of newly minted crypto and transaction fees,
developers also focus on other incentives.73 As stated previously, a core
incentive to operate a PoS Node is the reduced energy cost.74 A crypto
protocol that does not require Nodes to compete with one another is more
cost-effective both in terms of energy and equipment, making the protocol
more sustainable and profitable for Node Managers.75
PoS also provides more security incentives than PoW by addressing
the two most prominent security risks: “double spending” and a “51
percent attack.”76 Double spending is where an investor attempts to spend
the same crypto twice.77 The PoS consensus mechanism commonly
mitigates double spending by verifying that, based on transaction history,
a given wallet has the requisite crypto to transfer.78 The other main
concern is a 51 percent attack, where a person or group controls 51
percent of a given crypto’s mining Nodes and uses that majority power to
alter the blockchain or confirm and record fraudulent transactions to a
block.79 Generally, cryptos are protected from this type of attack because
volunteers utilize the blockchain’s public ledger to identify irregularities
and there are too many miner Nodes for any one group to control.80 Within
PoS, however, rather than obtaining 51 percent of miner Nodes, attackers
must obtain 51 percent of all Nodes by acquiring 51 percent of the Staked
crypto.81 This burden is significantly higher than what a PoW attacker
would face, which adds another protective layer to the network.
73. See Bitcoin Nodes vs. Miners: Demystified, supra note 24. See also Proof-ofStake (POS), supra note 72.
74. See Section II.A.
75. See Bitcoin Energy Consumption Index, DIGICONOMIST, https://digiconomist.
net/bitcoin-energy-consumption [https://perma.cc/Q7NT-AQU4] (last visited Jan. 22,
2022).
76. See Proof-of-Stake (POS), supra note 72. See also What is Proof-of-Stake?,
COINDESK, https://www.coindesk.com/learn/2020/12/30/what-is-proof-of-stake/ [https:
//perma.cc/TP4S-ZYUU] (last visited Apr. 14, 2022). See generally, Crypto Glossary Cryptopedia, supra note 22.
77. What is Proof-of-Stake?, supra note 76.
78. Id.
79. Pawan Nahar, What are 51% Attacks in Cryptocurrencies?, ECON. TIMES (Aug.
31, 2021), https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/markets/cryptocurrency/what-are-51attacks-in-cryptocurrencies/articleshow/85802504.cms?from=mdr [https://perma.cc/QY
C9-VA3J].
80. Id.
81. See Proof-of-Stake (POS), supra note 72. See also What is Proof-of-Stake?,
supra note 76.

534

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XXVII

PoS has the added security incentive of penalizing Node Managers
through a process known as “slashing,” whereby a portion of the Staked
crypto can be automatically destroyed when triggered.82 Node Managers
can be slashed if they act maliciously, disconnect from the network, or
fail to validate a transaction.83 Slashing disincentivizes Node Managers
from operating in bad faith or conflicting with the majority of the
network.84 Additionally, this heightened security further incentivizes
Node Managers to operate in the network’s best interest and store more
crypto in a given wallet, making it prohibitively expensive to take over a
network.85
The primary incentive in PoS, however, is the Staking reward of
newly minted crypto and transaction fees, which furthers other goals of
the network. The reward encourages those who Stake to act in the
network’s best interest, which in turn strengthens the crypto’s price
stability and value of earned rewards.86 PoS also incentivizes Node
Managers to Stake more of a given crypto for a greater chance of earning
the block recording right, increasing loyalty to the network.87 Often, PoS
will require Staking a minimum amount of crypto to qualify as a validator
Node eligible to receive rewards.88 For example, the second most popular
crypto, Ether, will complete the transition to PoS within the next few
years.89 The transition project known as “Ethereum 2.0,”90 will require
Node Managers to Stake a minimum of 32 ETH (over $96,000 on April

82. Vitalik Buterin, Why Proof of Stake (Nov 2020), VITALIK BUTERIN (Nov. 6,
2020), https://vitalik.ca/general/2020/11/06/pos2020.html [https://perma.cc/F47C-DD
QX].
83. Stake Your ETH to Become an Ethereum Validator, ETHEREUM, https://
ethereum.org/en/eth2/staking/ [https://perma.cc/BD9F-CSB4] (last visited Jan. 22,
2022).
84. Jake Frankenfield, Proof-of-Stake (PoS), INVESTOPEDIA (Dec. 17, 2021), https://
www.investopedia.com/terms/p/proof-stake-pos.asp [https://perma.cc/YYB8-FLXZ].
85. Sandler, supra note 11, at 260.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 258-59.
88. Paul Wackerow et al., Proof-of-Stake (POS), ETHEREUM (Jan. 26, 2022), https://
ethereum.org/en/developers/docs/consensus-mechanisms/pos/ [https://perma.cc/4XA2K8NR].
89. Id.
90. The great renaming: What happened to Eth2?, ETHEREUM FOUND. BLOG
(Jan. 24, 2022), https://blog.ethereum.org/2022/01/24/the-great-eth2-renaming/ [https://
perma.cc/3RLK-R7MP].
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14, 2022) to qualify as a validator.91 A minimum Stake of 32 ETH may
be too steep for some investors, preventing them from participating in
Staking.92 This burden, however, “is quickly solved with the help of pools
of depositors accepting various crypto[].”93
By aggregating crypto into a large Staking pool, Node Managers
offer investors the chance to receive the reward of newly minted crypto
and transaction fees.94 In return, the third-party Node Managers who
operate these pools receive either a fixed or variable fee for their service.95
Today, many Node Managers help investors Stake crypto; the two most
popular avenues for crypto investors are exchanges and independent
Staking pools.96 Staking pools generally allow investors to Stake small
amounts of crypto by transferring ownership of the crypto to the pool
during the lock-up period.97 The Node Manager then maintains the Node’s
operation and connection to the network while periodically distributing
earned rewards to pool contributors.98 Exchanges, such as Coinbase and
Kraken, operate such Staking pools in addition to other crypto products
like wallet and exchange services.99

91. Stake Your ETH to Become an Ethereum Validator, supra note 83 (indicating
that a miner needs 32 ETH2 to become a validator). See also, Ethereum 2 (ETH2) Price,
Charts, and News, COINBASE, https://www.coinbase.com/price/ethereum-2 [https://
perma.cc/Z8FC-PC6L] (last visited Apr. 14, 2022).
92. See Stake Your ETH to Become an Ethereum Validator, supra note 83 (indicating
that a miner needs 32 ETH2 to become a validator). See also Overview of Cloud PoW
and PoS, Mining, HIVE BLOG, https://hive.blog/ico/@atb-coin/overview-of-cloud-powand-pos-mining [https://perma.cc/DD7Q-GX5H] (last visited Jan. 22, 2022).
93. See Overview of Cloud PoW and PoS Mining, supra note 92.
94. See id.
95. See Sandler, supra note 11, at 262‐63. See also Earn Staking Rewards on
Coinbase, COINBASE, https://www.coinbase.com/staking [https://perma.cc/582Y-BZ
QQ] (last visited Jan. 23, 2022).
96. See Ofir Beigel, What is Proof of Stake and How to Stake Ethereum, 99BITCOINS,
https://99bitcoins.com/proof-of-stake/ [https://perma.cc/CRW2-TBLG] (last visited Jan.
4, 2022).
97. See id.
98. See Sandler, supra note 11; CRYPTO STAKING: BEST CRYPTO STAKING
PLATFORM BINANCE, https://www.binance.com/en/staking [https://perma.cc/2TEECAMZ] (indicating that staking interest is distributed on a daily basis) (last visited Apr.
14, 2022).
99. See Beigel, supra note 96. See also Earn Staking Rewards on Coinbase, supra
note 87; Features Overview, KRAKEN, https://www.kraken.com/en-us/features/ [https://
perma.cc/5LHM-2TPL] (last visited Jan. 21, 2022).
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III. PROOF-OF-STAKE PROTOCOLS’ EXPOSURE TO REGULATION
Although a robust regulatory regime is far from complete, several
federal regulatory agencies have engaged with the topic of crypto as early
as 2014.100 While commentators and academics alike regularly debate
whether crypto practices are investment contracts under SEC jurisdiction,
Staking in particular is a promising development in crypto technology that
needs clarification. To pursue this clarity, Section III.A. surveys key
positions from the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS), the CFTC, and the SEC. Section III.B.
applies the current SEC framework to third-party Staking practices.
A. FEDERAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
1. FinCEN
To detect and prevent money laundering, Congress passed the Bank
Secrecy Act of 1970, which required Money Services Businesses (MSBs)
to register with FinCEN.101 Certain issuers and exchangers of cryptos
have been required to register as MSBs with FinCEN.102 On March 18,
2013, FinCEN published guidance announcing it would not distinguish
between transmitters of government-backed currency and “decentralized
convertible virtual currency,” meaning crypto.103 The guidance states that
exchangers and administrators of cryptos are money transmitters under
FinCEN’s regulations and must register as MSBs unless they fall within
an exception.104
100.
101.
102.
103.

See Sandler, supra note 11, at 263.
31 U.S.C. § 5330 (2012); 31 C.F.R. § 1022.380 (2011).
See Sandler, supra note 11, at 264.
FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, DEPT. TREASURY, APPLICATION OF FINCEN’S
REGULATIONS TO PERSONS ADMINISTERING, EXCHANGING, OR USING VIRTUAL
CURRENCIES, FIN-2013-G001 (Mar. 18, 2013).
104. See Sandler, supra note 11, at 265 (citing 31 C.F.R. § 1010.100(ff)(5)(ii)).
An exchanger is defined as a person or entity “engaged as a business
in the exchange of virtual currency for real currency, funds, or other
virtual currency.” An administrator of virtual currency is defined as a
person or entity “engaged as a business in issuing (putting into
circulation) a virtual currency, and who has the authority to redeem
(to withdraw from circulation) such virtual currency.
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FinCEN updated its guidance in 2014 to exempt miners from the
registration, reporting, and recordkeeping regulations required of
MSBs.105 This exception only applies, however, if the miner uses it solely
for his or her own purpose and not for the benefit of another.106 Just as
issuers/developers (such as Ethereum) and exchanges (such as Coinbase)
must register with FinCEN as MSBs, independent Staking pools may also
be considered money transmitters required to register as MSBs. 107 This is
because they accept and transmit crypto on behalf of others and are
compensated in connection with such services.108 This requirement,
however, is outside the scope of this Note.
2. IRS
On March 25, 2014, the IRS issued Notice IR-2014-36-21, which
provides that cryptos are treated as property (not currency) for federal tax
purposes.109 This means that an increase in the fair market value of a given
crypto is classified as a taxable gain, similar to tangible property or
securities.110 The IRS also announced that taxpayers who mine crypto
realize gross income upon receipt of the crypto resulting from those
activities.111 Meanwhile, in the Build Back Better Act, Congress proposed
taxing cryptos more like stocks by subjecting them to “wash sale” rules.112
This would mean that a loss on the sale of crypto is “not [tax] deductible
if the taxpayer acquires substantially identical [crypto] within 30 days
before or after the sale (61-day period).”113 The IRS’ view of crypto shows
Id.

105. See Sandler, supra note 11, at 265 (citing FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, DEPT.
TREASURY, supra note 104).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See Sandler, supra note 11, at 265-66 (explaining that cloud mining companies,
similar to independent Staking and pool organizations, may also be considered MSBs
under FinCEN guidance).
109. I.R.S. Notice 2014-21 § 4.
110. See id.
111. See id.
112. See Daren Fonda, The SEC May Be Coming for Stablecoins, While Congress
Aims to Treat Cryptos More Like Stocks, BARRON’S (Sept. 15, 2021), https://www.
barrons.com/articles/cryptocurrencies-bitcoin-stablecoins-regulation-51631724992
[https://perma.cc/C7HJ-YVZ9] (last visited Apr. 14, 2022).
113. See Proposed Rules Would Apply Wash Sale and Constructive Sale Rules to
Cryptocurrency, WOLTERS KLUWER (Dec. 21, 2021), https://www.wolterskluwer.com/

538

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XXVII

that agencies are comfortable excluding digital assets from the currency
classification, while the provisions of the Build Back Better Act
demonstrate Congress’ comfort in doing the same.
3. CFTC
The CFTC regulates the derivatives markets, which include futures,
swaps, and certain kinds of options.114 Its mission is to promote the
integrity, resilience, and vibrancy of the derivatives markets.115 The
CFTC first found Bitcoin and other cryptos to be defined as commodities
in 2015.116 This definition implicates CFTC jurisdiction when crypto is
“used in a derivatives contract, or if there is fraud or manipulation
involving crypto traded in interstate commerce.”117 Beyond these
instances, however, the CFTC does “not oversee exchanges or
transactions that do not utilize margin, leverage, or financing.”118
In an October 2019 interview, then-Chairman of the CFTC, Heath P.
Tarbert, stated that Ether, similar to Bitcoin, “is a commodity and
therefore would fall under [CFTC] jurisdiction[].”119 Soon after, however,
Chairman Tarbert cast doubt on whether Ethereum’s new PoS crypto,
Ethereum 2.0, will fall into the same commodity classification as the PoW
crypto, but noted that the key attribute of decentralization is present in
both.120 Tarbert further reasoned that “[t]he more decentralized” the
en/expert-insights/application-of-wash-sale-and-constructive-sale-rules-tocryptocurrency-and-digital-assets [https://perma.cc/FC2P-XW4U].
114. U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commommission, USA.GOV, https://www.
usa.gov/federal-agencies/u-s-commodity-futures-trading-commission [https://perma.cc/
CY7F-XG59] (last visited Apr. 14, 2022).
115. See The Commission, CFTC, https://www.cftc.gov/About/AboutThe
Commission [https://perma.cc/VT5Q-9PWB] (last visited Jan. 26, 2022).
116.
See Coinflip, Inc., CFTC Docket No. 15-29 (2015).
117. See A CFTC Primer on Virtual Currencies, LABCFTC (Oct. 17, 2017),
https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/documents/file/labcftc_primer
currencies100417.pdf?mod=article_inline [https://perma.cc/62C8-CPZF].
118. See id. See also Press Release, CFTC, In Case You Missed It: Chairman Tarbert
Comments on Cryptocurrency Regulation at Yahoo! Finance All Markets Summit (Oct.
10, 2019), https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/8051-19 [https://perma.cc/
UKA6-2AH8].
119. Press Release, CFTC, supra note 118.
120. See Nikhilesh De, CFTC Chairman Heath Tarbert Talks Ethereum, Defi and the
Next BitMEX, COINDESK (Oct. 14, 2020), https://www.coindesk.com/policy/2020/10/14/
cftc-chairman-heath-tarbert-talks-ethereum-defi-and-the-next-bitmex
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crypto becomes, and “the more it effectively runs itself, the more likely it
[will fall] within the commodity category and not the securities
[category].”121 The issue is contingent, however, on what the SEC
decides.122 The CFTC generally defers to the SEC’s views on whether
something is an investment contract before bringing it under CFTC
jurisdiction as a commodity.123
4. SEC
Congress established the Securities and Exchange Commission
through the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.124 The SEC is the federal
agency responsible for regulating securities and investment contracts to
protect main street investors and ensure fair and efficient markets.125 In
terms of crypto, the SEC continues to hear debates about whether they
fall into one of the traditional financial product categories.126 Advocates
of strong regulation and proponents of free crypto markets continuously
clash over whether a given crypto product lands under SEC jurisdiction
and thus should be classified as an investment contract.
In this instance, the future of PoS regulation comes down to the SEC.
The IRS already treats cryptos as appreciable assets and FinCEN may
follow suit to require Node Managers to register and report as MSBs.
While cryptos like Bitcoin and Ether are currently classified as
commodities, the CFTC’s deference to the SEC on such matters makes
that status less than secure.127 The next Section discusses the SEC’s

[https://perma.cc/4RG6-Z4MG]. See also, Jon Buck & Max Moeller, Ethereum 2.0’s
Proof of Stake could be Classified as a Security, Says CFTC, Chairman,
BEINCRYPTO (Nov. 16, 2019), https://beincrypto.com/ethereum-2-0-proof-of-stakecould-be-classified-as-a-security-says-cftc-chairman
[https://perma.cc/5SSM-KLB7]
(explaining that “Tarbert told the audience during the interview that the previously held
view that Ethereum is a commodity is now in jeopardy”).
121. De, supra note 120.
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. See Securities & Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78d.
125. See What We Do, supra note 8.
126. See Are Cryptocurrencies Securities? The SEC is Answering the Question,
REUTERS, https://www.reuters.com/legal/transactional/are-cryptocurrencies-securitiessec-is-answering-question-2022-03-21/ [https://perma.cc/2GBN-47NV] (last visited
Apr. 14, 2022).
127. Coinflip, Inc., supra note 116.
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framework for classifying an investment contract, as well as outlines the
discussion around PoS.
B. THE SECURITIES ACT AND ITS APPLICATION TO PROOF-OF-STAKE
In the wake of the 1929 market crash, and before the establishment
of the SEC, Congress adopted the Securities Act of 1933 (“‘33 Act”) to
provide investors with adequate information concerning investment
contracts being offered for public sale and “prohibit deceit,
misrepresentation, and other fraud in the sale of securities.”128 The ‘33
Act defines a “security” as:
[A]ny note, stock, treasury stock, security future, security-based swap,
bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or
participation in any profit-sharing agreement. . .investment contract. .
.or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a
“security”, or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary
or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right
to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.129

While interpretation of the ‘33 Act’s “security” definition has been
litigated many times, the Supreme Court’s decision in Securities &
Exchange Commission v. W.J. Howey Co. interprets investment contracts
under the ‘33 Act.130 In Howey, a Florida citrus fruit cultivation company
sold service contracts that allowed individuals to purchase 10-year
leasehold interests in citrus groves cultivated and managed by the W.J.
Howey Company.131
Under Howey, the Court ruled a contract constitutes an investment
contract if there is (i) an investment of money; (ii) in a common
enterprise; (iii) with an expectation of profits; (iv) derived solely from the
efforts of a promoter or third party, regardless of “whether the shares in
the enterprise are evidenced by formal certificates or by nominal interests
128. The Laws That Govern the Securities Industry, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Oct.
1, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/answers/about-lawsshtml.html [https://perma.cc/2MD7DPYD].
129. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2012).
130. See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946). See also
James D. Gordon III, Defining a Common Enterprise in Investment Contracts, 72 OHIO
ST. L.J. 59, 65 (2011) (“The leading case regarding the definition of investment contracts
is SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.”).
131. See Howey, 328 U.S. at 295-96.
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in the physical assets employed by the enterprise.”132 This four-pronged
test is known as the Howey Test.133
Many of the concerns surrounding Staking arrangements between
investors and Node Managers are reminiscent of the Supreme Court’s
apprehensions in Howey. Specifically, the economic incentives,
remoteness of investors, insufficient demarcation of property, resulting
payment, investor reliance on the manager/promoter, and the economies
of scale all indicate that Staking arrangements may be considered
securities under the ‘33 Act.134 This Section will discuss each prong of the
Howey Test in turn, outlining the arguments for and against classification
of Staking arrangements as investment contracts.
1. Howey Test Prong One: Investment of Money
The first prong in the Howey Test considers whether there was an
investment of money.135 By definition, an investment is “an [exchange]
of money or capital to gain profitable returns, such as interest, income, or
appreciation in value.”136 The Ninth Circuit stated the Howey Test’s first
prong is met where an individual investor “commit[s] his assets to the
enterprise in such a manner as to subject himself to financial loss.”137
Typically, the investment of money prong is “not a disputed element in a
case and is generally understood to include any form of consideration
including crypto itself.”138
Advocates for stronger regulation argue that Staking arrangements
satisfy the first prong of Howey because investors contribute crypto to
Node Managers who lock up the crypto to validate transactions on the

See id. at 298-301.
See e.g., Sandler, supra note 11, at 252-53.
See Sandler, supra note 11, at 271.
See Howey, 328 U.S. at 301.
See Investment, DICTIONARY.COM, https://www.dictionary.com/browse/
investment [https://perma.cc/R7P9-YLWH] (last visited Apr. 14, 2022).
137. Warfield v. Alaniz, 569 F.3d 1015, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 2009).
138. See Sandler, supra note 11, at 272 (citing Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439
U.S. 551, 560 n.12 (1979)); SEC v. SG Ltd., 265 F.3d 42, 46-47 (1st Cir. 2001). See also
Hector v. Wiens, 533 F.2d 429, 432-33 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Faiella, 39 F.
Supp. 3d 544, 545 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“Bitcoin clearly qualifies as ‘money.’”); SEC v.
Shavers, Civ. No. 4:13-CV-416, 2013 WL 4028182, at *2 (E.D. Tex., Aug. 6, 2013)
(stating that paying in bitcoin satisfies the “investment of money” prong of the Howey
Test).
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
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blockchain.139 If granted the recording right, the Node Managers receive
the reward and allocate the earnings to investors.140 They also argue
investors commit crypto to the enterprise in a manner as to subject
themselves to financial loss through the possibility of theft or slashing. 141
Proponents of free crypto markets argue that Staking arrangements
do not satisfy this prong because satisfaction depends on whether
investors transfer custody of their crypto to a third party or delegate
Staking rights without relinquishing custody.142 They reason that
investors who transfer ownership to a Node Manager subject themselves
to the risk of theft or slashing, while investors who delegate Staking rights
do not expose themselves to that risk.143
The majority of Staking arrangements may fulfill the “investment of
money” prong of the Howey Test because investors typically must
transfer ownership of crypto to participate in the Staking pool. Though it
is correct that investors who delegate are not exposed to a risk of loss, this
argument fails to acknowledge that delegate Staking arrangements are in
the minority of PoS cryptos.144 The majority of PoS arrangements require
investors to transfer custody and expose themselves to theft or slashing,
meeting the standard for an investment of money under Howey.145
2. Howey Test Prong Two: In a Common Enterprise
The second prong of the Howey Test considers whether the
investment of money was in a common enterprise.146 After the Supreme
Court’s decision in Howey, various circuit courts issued decisions that
vary in their interpretation of what constitutes a “common enterprise.”147
Circuits are split among three commonality approaches: (i) horizontal, (ii)
broad vertical, and (iii) narrow (strict) vertical.148 Horizontal
Id. Sandler, supra note 11, at 272.
See discussion supra Section II.B.2.
See Sandler, supra note 11, at 272. See also discussion supra Section II.B.2.b.
Securities Law Considerations for Staking Services, supra note 11.
See id.
What is Delegated Proof of Stake (DPoS)?, BYBIT LEARN (Sept. 10, 2021),
https://learn.bybit.com/blockchain/delegated-proof-of-stake-dpos/
[https://perma.cc/FC7N-YG2R].
145. Id.
146. See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946).
147. See Gordon, supra note 130, at 60-61, 68.
148. See Sandler, supra note 11, at 272.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
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commonality is satisfied where there is a pooling of funds and profits are
dependent upon the overall success of the venture, whereas vertical
commonality is satisfied where profits are dependent upon the
manager/promoter’s efforts.149 While the Supreme Court has reaffirmed
the decision in Howey, it has declined to conclusively resolve the circuit
split.150
Advocates for stronger regulation believe the Howey analysis turns
on whether Staking arrangements fall under “common enterprises.151
Even proponents of free crypto markets point to SEC policy discussions
and concede that the “common enterprise” prong will almost always be
satisfied and instead suggest that Staking arrangements fail Howey’s other
prongs.152 This Section discusses each commonality approach and how it
applies to Staking arrangements in turn.
a. Horizontal Commonality
Horizontal commonality is satisfied when there is a pooling of
investor funds or assets such that investors share in the risks and losses of
the venture pro rata (correlated returns).153 The Second, Third, Fourth,
Sixth, and Seventh Circuits all use horizontal commonality in their Howey
determinations.154 The Seventh Circuit held horizontal commonality to
consist of “a pooling of interest[] not only between the . . . promoter and
each individual ‘investor’ but also among the ‘investors.’”155 The Second
Circuit noted that the “pooling” follows a pro rata distribution of profits
dependent upon the “profitability of the enterprise as a whole.”156
See Gordon, supra note 130, at 61, 66-68.
See Sandler, supra note 11, at 272.
Id. at 280 (“[T]he prong on which the analysis turns is likely the ‘common
enterprise.’”).
152. Securities Law Considerations for Staking Services, supra note 11 (citing
Framework for “Investment Contract” Analysis of Digital Assets, U.S. SEC. & EXH.
COMM’N (Apr. 3, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/corpfin/framework-investment-contractanalysis-digital-assets [https://perma.cc/FV36-V3MJ]) (last visited Jan. 21, 2022).
153. See Gordon supra note 130, at 66-68. See also Revak v. SEC Realty Corp., 18
F.3d 81, 87-88 (2d Cir. 1994); Wals v. Fox Hills Dev. Corp., 24 F.3d 1016, 1017-19 (7th
Cir. 1994); Newmyer v. Philatelic Leasing, Ltd., 888 F.2d 385, 394, 396 (6th Cir. 1989);
Salcer v. Merrill Lynch, 682 F.2d 459, 460 (3d Cir. 1982).
154. See Revak, 18 F.3d at 87-88; Wals, 24 F.3d at 1018-19; Newmyer, 888 F.2d at
394; Salcer, 682 F.2d at 460; Teague v. Bakker, 35 F.3d 978, 986 (4th Cir. 1994).
155. See Wals, 24 F.3d at 1018.
156. See Revak, 18 F.3d at 87.
149.
150.
151.
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Advocates of stronger regulation argue Staking arrangements satisfy
the requirements of horizontal commonality. They reason PoS pooling
involves the commingling of investor funds (crypto) into a single digital
wallet to meet the minimum validator requirements and increase the
likelihood that a given Node will receive the recording right.157 Each
investor’s crypto is pooled, such that investors share in the rewards earned
per their contribution (Stake).158 The newly minted crypto and transaction
fees earned are then periodically distributed to the investors pro rata.159
Advocates further contend that investors contribute crypto to a pool
of capital which are contingent upon the success of the Node and at risk
of slashing.160 It is therefore likely that, in jurisdictions where the standard
is horizontal commonality, Staking arrangements meet the commonality
requirement under the Howey Test.
b. Broad Vertical Commonality
It also may be likely that Staking arrangements meet the broad
vertical commonality requirement. Adopted by the Fifth and Eleventh
Circuits, broad vertical commonality is met when there is a
manager/promotor that investors rely upon to earn a profit.161 The Fifth
Circuit further stated that broad vertical commonality is present where

157. See Sandler, supra note 11, at 258. See also How It Works, STAKEMINERS,
https://stakeminers.com/about.php (last visited Jan. 23, 2022).

As our staking pool is quite large, over 100 BTC worth of various
Altcoins . . . . Each week the new altcoins we receive become your
earnings which are then payed [sic] out to you based on the percentage
of Stakeminers you own. If you own 5% of Stakeminers, then you will
receive 5 [percent] of the weeks [sic] earnings. The cycle is simple:
the more coins we hold, the more coins we can stake, the more coins
we stake, the more earning [sic] generated each week, and the more
payout you will receive.
Id.

See discussion supra Section II.B.2.b.
See Sandler, supra note 11, at 272-73.
See id.
See Gordon, supra note 130, at 67-68. See also SEC v. ETS Payphones, Inc., 408
F.3d 727, 728-32 (11th Cir. 2005); Long v. Shultz Cattle Co., 881 F.2d 129, 133 (5th Cir.
1989).
158.
159.
160.
161.
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investors as a collective rely upon the manager/promotor’s expertise or
skill for the return of a profit rather than themselves.162
Advocates of stronger regulation argue broad vertical commonality
is likely satisfied in Staking arrangements because of the investorpromoter relationship where users are reliant on the Node Manager to
generate rewards.163 Here, the Node Manager creates the pooled digital
wallet, hosts the Node, runs the applicable protocol, and maintains the
Node’s connection to the network, while the investor simply contributes
crypto.164 Without the Node Manager, investors must operate Nodes
themselves to earn Staking rewards. These advocates claim investors’
reliance on a Node Manager’s expertise and skill of operating and
maintaining the Node is sufficient to satisfy Broad vertical
commonality.165
Proponents of free crypto markets could argue that broad vertical
commonality is not met due to the amount of chance involved in a pool
receiving the recording rights and the subsequent reward. While investors
rely on the expertise of the Node Manager to maintain and operate the
Node, it is also true that the reward is largely dependent on the PoS and
how it assigns recording rights.166 Unfortunately, this argument is unlikely
to prevail in most instances. Although chance plays a role in a Node
Manager’s success, expertise is the primary factor in receiving a reward.
As discussed previously, Node Managers can increase their ability to
make and keep returns by utilizing economies of scale, acting in good
faith with the network, and ensuring proper node maintenance to limit
slashing.167 In this sense, Node Managers must compete to manage the
pool efficiently and effectively to ensure a regular Staking reward. It is
therefore likely that broad vertical commonality is met by a Staking
arrangement because of investors’ primary reliance upon the expertise of
the Node Manager.

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

See Long, 881 F.2d at 140-41.
See Sandler, supra note 11, at 275.
See id. at 278-79.
See id. at 275-76.
What is Proof-of-Stake?, supra note 76.
Id.
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c. Narrow (Strict) Vertical Commonality
Accepted by the Ninth Circuit, narrow (strict) vertical commonality
is met where the returns of the investor and promotor (here the Node
Manager) rise and fall together because the promoter is financially linked
to the investment at issue.168 Unlike broad vertical and horizontal
commonality, narrow vertical commonality “does not require the pooling
of resources relationship to exist between investors [and] an
enterprise.”169 All that is necessary is for the profits of the Node Manager
to rise and fall with the individual investor.170
Advocates of stronger regulation contend that narrow vertical
commonality in Staking arrangements largely depends on the fee
arrangements of the Node Manager.171 Although some charge a flat fee,
many Stake alongside their investors or receive a percentage commission
of the newly minted crypto and transaction fees.172 Node Managers who
contribute crypto alongside their investors or receive a percentage
commission are more likely to satisfy narrow vertical commonality
because their profits and that of the investor rise and fall together.173 In
this case, the investor’s pro rata share of any profits rises based on the
Node Manager’s ability to generate rewards and falls if they fail to
maintain and operate the Node properly. Thus, Staking arrangements
likely fulfill the narrow vertical commonality test of Howey’s
commonality requirement.
3. Howey Test Prong Three: With the Expectation of Profit
The third prong of the Howey Test considers whether investors
expect a profit. Under Howey, investors are required to have a clear
expectation of future profits for an agreement to constitute an investment
168. See SEC v. SG Ltd., 265 F.3d 42, 49 (1st Cir. 2001) (requiring that the investors’
fortunes be “interwoven with and dependent upon the efforts and success of those seeking
the investment or of third parties”).
169. Jacob D. Crawley, A Security by Any Other Name: An Inquiry into Staking
Agreements as Securities, 9 UNLV GAMING L.J. 201, 213-14 (2019).
170. See Sandler, supra note 11, at 275.
171. Id.
172. See id. at 275-76. See also How It Works, STAKEMINERS, https://stakeminers.
com/about.php [https://perma.cc/Q88A-ZUND] (last visited Jan. 23, 2022); Who We are,
supra note 92; Beigel, supra note 96.
173. See Sandler, supra note 11, at 276.
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contract.174 The Supreme Court defined “profits” to include (1) “capital
appreciation resulting from the development of the initial investment,” or
(2) “a participation in earnings resulting from the use of investor
funds.”175 To determine investor expectations, courts often consider the
marketing language used by the manager/promoter.176 The SEC advises
looking at “the ‘economic reality’ of the transaction” with a list of
dispositive factors, including “what character the instrument is given in
commerce by the terms of the offer, the plan of distribution, and the
economic inducements held out to the prospect.”177
Advocates for stronger regulation claim Staking arrangements likely
produce the characterization of “profits” required by an investment
contract. They point to investor participation in earnings of newly minted
crypto and transaction fees resulting from the use of their crypto
holdings.178 They also claim investors expect these profits based on the
Node Managers’ marketing language.179 Blockchain developers,
exchanges, and independent Staking pools all market the possible
investment returns on their websites.180 Further, investors in Staking
arrangements are generally motivated by the expected returns of newly
minted crypto and transaction fees generated from Staking.181
Proponents for free crypto markets argue most Staking arrangements
are not profit-making mechanisms, but rather “efforts to maintain the
See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946).
See Crawley, supra note 169, at 214 (quoting United Hous. Found., Inc. v.
Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 (1975)).
176. See Howey, 328 U.S. at 296-97 (“[The investors] are attracted by the expectation
of substantial profits. It was represented, for example, that profits during the 1943-1944
season mounted to 20 [percent] and that even greater profits might be expected during
the 1944-1945 season . . . .”). See also SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 390 (2004) (“[T]he
investing public is attracted by representations of investment income.”); Framework for
“Investment Contract” Analysis of Digital Assets, supra note 9.
177. See Framework for “Investment Contract” Analysis of Digital Assets, supra note
9.
178. See supra, Section II.B.2.
179. Sandler, supra note 11, at 277.
180. See Staking Assets; Rewards: Crypto Staking, KRAKEN, https://www.kraken.
com/en-us/features/staking-coins [https://perma.cc/YS7F-UKZ7] (last visited Feb. 1,
2022). See also Ethereum Staking, ETHEREUM, https://ethereum.org/en/eth2/staking/ (last
visited Jan. 22, 2022); Stake Blockchain Assets and Get Rewarded: Tezos (XTZ), Сosmos
(Atom) and Other, P2P VALIDATOR, https://p2p.org/ [https://perma.cc/T2CL-JMSF] (last
visited Feb. 1, 2022).
181. Sandler, supra note 11, at 277.
174.
175.
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value of the member’s investment and secure the overall network.” 182
They reason that PoS validation inherently introduces more crypto into
the network, leading to inflation.183 Further, they say failing to participate
in the Staking practice can result in losses, rather than gains, due to
inflation.184
Staking arrangements likely fulfill the “expectation of profits” prong
of the Howey Test because investors are told that contributing crypto will
earn them rewards. While retention of value might seem like a reasonable
argument at first, it fails to take into account that inflation is an aspect of
all currencies and investing as a means to combat inflation is still an
investment with the expectation of profits.185 For these reasons, Staking
arrangements may fulfill the “expectation of profits” prong of the Howey
Test.
4. Howey Test Prong Four: Derived Solely from the Efforts of Others
The fourth prong of the Howey Test considers whether the profit is
realized through the efforts of someone other than the investor. Howey
requires that an investment contract includes profits produced “solely
from the efforts of others.”186 The appellate courts all accept the Ninth
Circuit’s interpretation of the word “solely” as having a more realistic
connotation rather than a literal or strict one.187 This pragmatic standard
requires that “the efforts made by those other than the investor are the
undeniably significant ones, those essential managerial efforts which
affect the failure or success of the enterprise.”188 The SEC expands on this

Securities Law Considerations for Staking Services, supra note 11.
Id.
Id.
See Nick Lioudis, Treasury Bonds vs. Treasury Notes vs. Treasury Bills,
INVESTOPEDIA (Aug. 31, 2021), https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/033115/
what-are-differences-between-treasury-bond-and-treasury-note-and-treasury-billtbill.asp [https://perma.cc/B536-SVFW]. See also Treasury Securities & Programs,
TREASURY DIRECT, https://www.treasurydirect.gov/indiv/products/products.htm [https://
perma.cc/F7BU-GRMY] (last visited Feb. 4, 2022).
186. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946).
187. Sandler, supra note 11, at 278; SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc., et al., 474
F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir. 1973).
188. Turner 474 F.2d at 48.
182.
183.
184.
185.
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inquiry and instructs courts to focus on whether the purchaser reasonably
expects to rely on the manager/promotor’s efforts.189
Advocates of stronger regulation argue applying the Ninth Circuit’s
realistic test for “solely” to Staking arrangements likely fulfills the fourth
prong.190 They maintain Staking investors have virtually no control over
their investment or producing returns once ownership is transferred but
instead rely on the Node Manager’s efforts.191 In a Staking arrangement,
investors contribute crypto to a pooled digital wallet set up by the Node
Manager, after which the Node Manager maintains and operates the Node
to earn rewards in the form of newly minted crypto and transaction fees.192
Proponents of free crypto markets contend the relevant question is
whether the investor relinquishes control to the Node Manager or retains
control of the crypto by delegating Staking rights.193 They argue investors
who delegate, retain, and exert control over their cryptos reduce the
significance of Node Managers.194 They also argue Node Managers “only
perform a particular function (validating transactions) in a specific way
(according to a network’s protocol),” which makes their efforts more
operational than managerial.195 Further, they say the success of the
network is dependent on the decentralized network at large rather than on
a discrete Node Manager’s actions.196 The proponents fail to mention,
however, that once delegated investors lock up their crypto and vote for
the designated period, they rely on their chosen Node Manager to
maintain and operate the Node. Also, while Node Managers “only”
validate transactions, this validation process is the very Staking
mechanism that earns rewards, the entire goal of the endeavor. Thus,
Staking arrangements likely satisfy the derived solely from the efforts of
others prong of Howey.
189. Framework for “Investment Contract” Analysis of Digital Assets, U.S. SEC. &
EXCH. COMM’N (Apr. 3, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/corpfin/framework-investmentcontract-analysis-digital-assets [https://perma.cc/3E3K-BTY2].
190. Sandler, supra note 11, at 278.
191. Ofir Beigel, What is Proof of Stake and How to Stake Ethereum, 99 BITCOIN,
https://99bitcoins.com/proof-of-stake/ (last visited Jan. 23, 2022).
192. Proof of Stake FAQs, ETHEREUM WIKI, https://eth.wiki/en/concepts/proof-ofstake-faqs [https://perma.cc/74E6-4X2V] (last visited Jan. 22, 2022).
193. Securities Law Considerations for Staking Services, supra note 11.
194. Id.
195. Id. (citing S.E.C. v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc. 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir.
1973)).
196. Id.
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C. UNUSUAL INSTRUMENTS: MARINE BANK V. WEAVER
There is another route aside from Howey through which Staking
arrangements may be classified as investment contracts. The Supreme
Court stated that “[c]ongress intended the securities laws to cover those
instruments ordinarily and commonly considered to be securities in the
commercial world.”197 In Marine Bank v. Weaver, the Supreme Court
narrowed the Howey Test by permitting exceptions to unusual
instruments that are both unique and lack financial risk.198 In Marine
Bank, the Court considered whether the certificates of deposit (CD) sold
by a federally regulated bank were securities.199 The Court made two
important pronouncements regarding unusual instruments. First, it
determined that the greater the number of potential investors, the more
likely an agreement is not unique.200 Second, it held that an agreement
whose product contains little to no risk is not likely to constitute an
investment contract.201 The Court held a CD was not an investment
contract because it was not unusual and was federally insured, it posed no
financial risk to investors.202
A court would likely determine a Staking arrangement constitutes an
“uncommon or irregular instrument,” as it falls outside the common
understanding of an investment contract under the ‘33 Act.203 Depending
on the Node Manager, however, this uniqueness may be defeated if she
solicits a large number of investors to join the pool.204 When compared to
a federally insured CD, Staking arrangements also have more financial
risk due to slashing and theft.205 Despite the outcomes of both the Howey
and Marine Bank Tests, however, Staking arrangements may still fall
under a federal exemption from SEC registration.

197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 559 (1982).
Id. at 556.
Id. at 552.
Id. at 559-60.
Id. 558.
Marine Bank, 455 U.S. at 559.
Id. at 556.
Id.
See supra Section II.B.1.
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D. EXEMPTIONS TO REGISTRATION UNDER THE ‘33 ACT
While it may be likely a court would find Staking arrangements to
constitute investment contracts under Howey and Marine Bank, Staking
arrangements may still avoid such a fate by qualifying for a registration
exemption to the ‘33 Act. Without an exemption, Node Managers will
need to register with the SEC, which requires costly periodic preparation
and filing of multiple complex disclosures.206 This section discusses the
various exemptions to the 33’Act and their applicability to Staking
arrangements.
1. Private Placements Exemption
The first exemption allows Node Managers to refrain from
registration when the Staking arrangement does not involve an offering
to the public, known as a “private placement.”207 While the SEC has not
provided guidance on the limits of this exception, the Supreme Court has
interpreted the exemption language to “turn on whether the particular
class of persons affected need the protection of the Act.”208 Circuit courts
have interpreted this protection by looking to factors that include, but are
not limited to, “the number of offerees[,]” their relationship to one another
and the issuer, the offerees’ sophistication, the size of the offering, and
“the manner of the offering.”209
Staking arrangements may escape registration through the private
placement exception if the arrangement is private or limited to a small
number of sophisticated investors. It is less clear, however, whether a
Staking arrangement offered by an exchange or independent Staking pool
would qualify for the exemption. Exchanges and independent Staking
pools generally advertise and market to the general public, offer the
Staking arrangement to a large number of investors, and likely do not have

206. See Securities Act of 1933 § 5(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2012). See also Exempt
Offerings, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/smallbusiness/exempt
offerings [https://perma.cc/JB7S-4WGW] (last visited Feb. 3, 2022).
207. Securities Act of 1933 § 4(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(2) (2012).
208. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953).
209. See United States v. Arutunoff, 1 F.3d 1112, 1118 (10th Cir. 1993); W. Fed.
Corp. v. Erickson, 739 F.2d 1439, 1442 (9th Cir. 1984); Cook v. Avien, Inc., 573 F.2d
685, 691 (1st Cir. 1978); Doran v. Petroleum Mgmt. Corp., 545 F.2d 893, 904 (5th Cir.
1977).
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close relationships with investors.210 Exchanges and independent Staking
pools rely on facilitating Staking arrangements for the general public to
meet the minimum Staking requirements and increase their chances of
receiving the reward.211 This is evidenced by the ability to contribute any
amount of crypto to the pool and their open advertising.212
2. Accredited Crowdfunding Offering Exemption
Node Managers may generally solicit from the public and refrain
from registration under Rule 506(c) under the ‘33 Act.213 Rule 506(c)
allows offerors to raise capital through the sale of securities without
having to register if all purchasers are accredited investors, and offerors
take reasonable steps to verify that investors are accredited.214 Through
this, exchanges and independent Staking pools could advertise to the
general public and offer the Staking arrangement to a large number of
investors, which is not possible under the private placement exemption.
While exchanges that operate as brokerage firms can easily implement
investor verification systems, independent Staking pools may not be as
well equipped. Accordingly, large Node Managers may have the
resources to comply with and utilize Rule 506(c), while smaller Node
Managers likely will not.
3. Limited Offering Exemption
Node Managers might also find exemption under Rule 504 of the ‘33
Act, known as the “limited offering” exemption. Rule 504 allows
registrants an exemption where the registrant offers and sells no greater

210. See Buy and Sell Bitcoin, Ethereum, and More with Trust, COINBASE,
https://www.coinbase.com/ [https://perma.cc/25Z5-2X2Q] (last visited Jan. 21, 2022).
See generally, Staking-as-a-Service - Best Staking Pools and Staking Service Providers,
DEFI PRIME, https://defiprime.com/staking [https://perma.cc/QJE7-QQTN] (last visited
Feb. 4, 2022).
211. Andy Rosen & Chris Davin, 5 Best Crypto Staking and Rewards Platforms of
February 2022, NERDWALLET (Jan. 18, 2022), https://www.nerdwallet.com/best/
investing/best-crypto-staking-platforms [https://perma.cc/F4MC-F8TG].
212. Andy Rosen & Chris Davin, supra note 211.
213. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(c) (2021).
214. Id.
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than $5,000,000 of securities within a 12-month period.215 The catch is
that under Rule 504, a registrant may not use “general solicitation and
advertising” to promote the investment contracts offered.216 Certain states
permit solicitation to accredited investors, but if sophistication is
necessary, a private placement may be a better fit.217 Node Managers will
likely not fulfill the limited offering exemption because they rely on
advertising to obtain investors, the $5,000,000 limit will prevent business
growth, and accreditation is too high a bar for investors to meet and for
Node Managers to verify.
4. Interstate Offering Exemption
The ‘33 Act also provides for a registration exemption if a business
seems to raise capital within a given state, known as the “intrastate
offering” exemption.218 The SEC exempts registrants where the offering
takes place in the same state the business mostly operates in and the
offering is only sold to residents of that state.219 Rule 147 provides
standards for companies seeking an intrastate exemption, including
whether the company verifies the residency of the purchaser of any
offerings through written representation.220 Exchanges and Staking pools
would likely not seek this exemption because the limitation to a singular
state is too burdensome, especially for crypto that is operated on a global
network and ideologically aligned with the values of decentralization.
5. Regulation A Offering Exemption
The final exemption, known as a “Regulation A” filing, provides for
registrants to register under Tier 1 or Tier 2, capping the amount an
offering can raise within a 12-month period, $20,000,000 and
$75,000,000 respectively.221 Tier 2 registrants have further limitations on
the amount non-accredited investors can contribute.222 Additionally, the
215. Securities Act of 1933 § 3(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b)(1) (2012); 17 C.F.R. §
230.504 (2018).
216. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c) (2018).
217. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2018).
218. Securities Act of 1933 § 3(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (2012).
219. Id.; 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (2018).
220. 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (2018).
221. 17 C.F.R. § 230.251 (2018).
222. Id.
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portion of the aggregate offering price attributable to secondary holders
of the security may not exceed 30 percent.223 Within this exception, large
and small exchanges and independent Staking pools are likely to meet
Regulation A exemption requirements. As long as exchanges and Staking
pools meet the Tier 1 offering cap of $20,000,000 and limit a potential
secondary market, they would not have to file supplemental disclosures
or expend the cost of verifying and managing non-accredited investors.
IV. EVALUATING PROOF-OF-STAKE
A. STAKING ARRANGEMENTS ARE LIKELY INVESTMENT CONTRACTS
Staking arrangements are likely securities under the ‘33 Act. As
outlined above, under Howey, a contract constitutes an investment
contract if there is (i) an investment of money; (ii) in a common
enterprise; (iii) with an expectation of profits; (iv) derived solely from the
efforts of a promoter or third party.224 Explicitly, Staking arrangements
involve individual investors contributing or delegating crypto to Staking
pools with the expectation of receiving a reward while relying on the
efforts of the pool’s Node Manager.225
There is tension between whether Staking’s classification as an
investment contract turns on the common enterprise prong or on both the
expectation of profits and the derived solely from the efforts of others
prongs. Advocates of stronger regulation argue that Staking Pools satisfy
the type of common enterprise considered in Howey, kicking Staking
arrangements into SEC jurisdiction.226 They reason that unless Node
Managers collect a flat fee, where Node Managers share in the profits.227
These advocates further argue that SEC required disclosure is necessary
to prevent the type of fraud and deception that comes from a lack of
regulation in the crypto markets.228 Proponents of free crypto markets
argue Staking’s classification hinges on the expectation of profits derived
solely from the efforts of others prongs.229 They contend, unpersuasively,
223.
224.
225.
226.

Id.
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-301 (1946).
See supra Section II.B.
Sandler, supra note 11, at 280 (“[T]he prong on which the analysis turns is likely
the ‘common enterprise.’”).
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Securities Law Considerations for Staking Services, supra note 11.
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that investors expect retention in value rather than profits, and that
investors do not rely on Node Managers to obtain these profits.230 They
further argue that SEC required disclosure is unnecessary to advance the
intent of the securities laws because blockchain’s open digital ledger
already allows for access to full and accurate information.231
Although the debate lives on, it is likely that advocates of stronger
regulation are correct for the current and typical iteration of PoS. The
investment of money prong is met because investors contribute their
crypto and subject themselves to the risk of financial loss by theft or
slashing.232 Crypto, such as Ether, contributed to pools are exposed to
theft and slashing if the Node Manager acts maliciously or fails to validate
transactions.233 While investors may participate in Staking arrangements
that utilize delegation and reduce the risk of slashing by not transferring
ownership, the vast majority of PoS cryptos do not support delegation and
are subject to theft and slashing.234
The common enterprise prong is met in jurisdictions that accept the
horizontal and broad vertical commonality approach, as well as those that
employ narrow vertical commonality where Node Managers collect a
percentage fee.235 In jurisdictions where horizontal commonality is used,
when a Node Manager aggregates all investor contributions into a single
mining pool (commingles assets), the arrangement is likely an investment
contract.236 Staking arrangements in jurisdictions that follow broad
vertical commonality are considered investment contracts because those
jurisdictions merely look for an investor-promoter relationship and some
level of dependence.237 Investors in Staking arrangements are almost
entirely dependent on Node Managers’ skill and expertise in operating
and maintaining the Node, satisfying the necessary dynamic.238
Conversely, in Staking arrangements where the Node Manager receives a
percentage fee, narrow (strict) vertical commonality is likely met because
the profits of the Node Manager rise and fall with the investor.239 In
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

See supra Sections III.B.3., III.B.4.
Id.
Supra Section III.B.1.
Proof-of-Stake (POS), supra note 47.
Supra Section III.B.1.
Supra Section III.B.2.
See Sandler, supra note 11, at 279-80.
Id.
Supra Section III.B.2.
Id.
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contrast, Staking arrangements where the Node Manager only receives a
fixed (as opposed to a percentage) fee may not be considered an
investment contract in jurisdictions that accept narrow (strict) vertical
commonality, because the profits of the investor and Node Manager are
not tied together.240
The expectation of profits prong is met because both Node Managers
and blockchain developers acknowledge the PoS incentive structure is
explicitly designed to grant rewards.241 Node Managers and developers
regularly market investment returns available for those who participate in
Staking, and investors lock up their crypto for these returns.242 While a
PoS incentive structure leads to crypto inflation, it does not counteract the
expectations of profits awarded to those who Stake.243
The efforts of others prong is met because investors almost
exclusively rely on essential managerial efforts of the Node Manager,
which directly affect the failure or success of the pool. 244 To successfully
Stake crypto, a Node Manager must operate, maintain, and solicit
contributions to maximize returns from rewards and minimize losses due
to slashing.245 This entails ensuring the Node complies with the proper
protocol, is continuously connected to the network, meets the minimum
validator requirements, and appropriately manages contributions and
distributions.246 While Nodes operating PoS verify and record
transactions according to the protocol, Staking is not an automated
endeavor, it requires Node Managers to take an active role.247
Under the current federal regulatory regime, Staking arrangements
are likely investment contracts and thereby require SEC registration.
Although registration would permit Node Managers to raise large
amounts of capital through public offerings, it would come at a significant
regulatory burden that many would not be able to satisfy.248 To comply
with the SEC’s aims of providing investors with the tools necessary to
See Sandler, supra note 11, at 279.
Supra Section III.B.3.
Id.
Id.
Supra Section III.B.4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See generally, Exchange Act Reporting and Registration, SEC, https://
www.sec.gov/smallbusiness/goingpublic/exchangeact [https://perma.cc/VF7T-YJGL]
(last updated Apr. 1, 2022).
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
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make informed decisions, Node Managers would have to file numerous
burdensome and costly disclosures.249 Disclosures would include
information relating to the essential managerial efforts that affect the
success of the enterprise unless they qualify for an exemption from
registration.250
Although Staking arrangements will likely not fall under the Private
Placement, Limited Offering, or Intrastate exemptions, they could have a
chance to avoid SEC filing requirements through Rule 506(c) and
Regulation A. The Private Placement, Limited Offering, and Interstate
exceptions generally limit the Node Manager’s ability to advertise and
solicit from the public at large as well as restrict contribution size and
potential investors.251 Large Node Managers may find an exemption
under Rule 506(c) that authorizes them to generally solicit investment
from the public if they can verify that investors are accredited.252 Staking
arrangements could similarly find exemption under Regulation A, which
would allow Node Managers to avoid regulatory burdens or the need to
supervise non-accredited investors if they are willing to limit the amount
of securities offered in a 12-month period (i.e., to $20,000,000).253
Though the Regulation A limitation is practical for small Node Managers,
larger ones, like exchanges, will find the limitation to be an impediment
on growth. There are, however, other actions Node Managers can take to
mitigate the chance of falling under SEC jurisdiction, as discussed in the
next Section.
B. AVOIDING INVESTMENT CONTRACT CLASSIFICATION AND SEC
JURISDICTION
1. Staking as a Service
Node Managers should consider the manner in which they charge
investors, because this may impact the arrangement’s classification as
investment contracts. As discussed previously, the Ninth Circuit, which
includes California and eight other states, accepts narrow (strict) vertical
249. Framework for “Investment Contract” Analysis of Digital Assets, U.S. Sec. &
Exch. Comm’n, https://www.sec.gov/corpfin/framework-investment-contract-analysisdigital-assets [https://perma.cc/8CCN-9PDX] (last visited Feb. 4, 2022).
250. Id.
251. Supra Section III.D.
252. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(c) (2021).
253. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.251 (2018).
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commonality where the returns of the investor and promotor must rise and
fall together to satisfy Howey’s common enterprise prong.254 Node
Managers who fall within this circuit’s jurisdiction may escape
classification as an investment contract if they charge flat fees rather than
a percentage fee. While not available on some PoS, a flat fee will
disentangle a Node Manager from the investor and fail the third Howey
prong, releasing it from investment contract status.255
2. Design of the Proof-of-Stake Protocol
Node Managers should also consider the design of the protocol. As
discussed earlier, PoS comes in many varieties. Some adjust the reward
incentives by assigning block recording rights equally among validators,
while others utilize delegation. Node Managers can choose PoS outside
of SEC jurisdiction by validating cryptos that reduce the need for large
Staking pools, create truly randomized algorithms for assigning recording
rights, and allow for delegation so that there is no contribution of crypto
to begin with. These characteristics, especially delegation, could prevent
Staking arrangements from satisfying the Howey Test. Through
delegation, investors may elect Node Managers to validate transactions
while retaining custody of the crypto. Delegation also allows Node
Managers to perform the Staking function on behalf of individuals
without commingling assets as well as incentivizes Node Managers to
compete.256 Here, the risk of falling within SEC jurisdiction is minimized
because crypto is not transferred nor commingled, potentially failing the
first and second prongs of Howey.
3. Token Safe Harbor Proposal 2.0
In February 2020, SEC Commissioner Hester M. Peirce first
proposed a safe harbor for cryptos.257 In April 2021, Commissioner Peirce
updated her original proposal to what is now known as the “Token Safe
254. What is the Ninth Circuit?, U.S. CTS. FOR 9TH CIR., https://www.ca9.uscourts.
gov/judicial-council/what-is-the-ninth-circuit/ [https://perma.cc/9PPM-SC9D] (last
visited Feb. 8, 2022).
255. Supra Section III.B.2.
256. See Securities Law Considerations for Staking Services, supra note 11.
257. See Hester Peirce, Running on Empty: A Proposal to Fill the Gap Between
Regulation and Decentralization SEC (Feb. 6, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/news/
speech/peirce-remarks-blockress-2020-02-06 [https://perma.cc/W9W6-UCHB].

2022]

DOES CRYPTOCURRENCY STAKING FALL
UNDER SEC JURISDICTION?

559

Harbor Proposal 2.0.”258 In it, Peirce describes the risk of federal
securities laws frustrating a given blockchain network’s ability to achieve
proper decentralization where tokens function as non-securities.259 She
further states the proposed safe harbor is intended to “provide Initial
Development Teams with a 3-year time period within which they can
facilitate participation in, and the continued development of, a functional
or decentralized network” exempt from securities registration so long as
certain conditions are met.260
The safe harbor provision protects crypto investors by requiring
semi-annual disclosures and preserving the anti-fraud provisions of the
federal securities laws throughout the 3-year grace period.261 At the end
of the 3-year period, the development team must determine and represent
that the network is sufficiently decentralized and that those transactions
do not constitute investment contracts transactions.262 Sufficient
decentralization is achieved when the network is either (i) not
economically or operationally controlled by a single person, entity or
group under common control, and the Initial Development Team owns 20
percent or less of the crypto or 20 percent or less of determining network
consensus, or (ii) functional.263
While the Token Safe Harbor Proposal 2.0 does not explicitly cover
pools, Staking arrangements may fall within its scope if it is shown to be
a critical component of achieving decentralization. If the Token Safe
Harbor Proposal is accepted by the SEC, blockchain developers can
utilize the 3-year safe harbor to develop PoS that either (i) satisfies the
securities laws exceptions, (ii) properly delegates Staking rights, or (iii)
reduces the incentive to create Staking pools, either by reducing the
minimum to Stake or by designing recording rights to be random.
Developers and Node Managers should advocate for the Token Safe
Harbor Proposal 2.0 to be accepted and utilize its generous safe harbor to
build networks that implement any of these characteristics.

258. See Hester Peirce, Token Safe Harbor Proposal 2.0, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N
(Apr. 13, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/peirce-statement-tokensafe-harbor-proposal-2.0 [https://perma.cc/6725-S9V9].
259. See id.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id.
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V. CONCLUSION
An analysis under the ‘33 Act demonstrates that Staking
arrangements are likely investment contracts. A federal court may find
that a Staking arrangement is “a contract, transaction, or scheme whereby
a person invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to expect
profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party.”264 Further,
Staking arrangements will not likely find exemption under Marine Bank,
because they are not unique and are often characterized by a large amount
of risk offset by a large return.265 Despite the likelihood that Staking
arrangements will be deemed investment contracts, Node Managers may
utilize registration exemptions under Rule 506(c) or Regulation A.266
Node Managers also have the opportunity to choose the crypto or fee
structure to escape SEC jurisdiction. A Staking arrangement where the
Node Manager receives a fixed fee that is not tied to the profits of the
investor will likely fail the Howey Test in jurisdictions that require narrow
(strict) vertical commonality. Participating in Staking alongside their
investors might classify their arrangement as an investment contract.
Blockchain developers and Node Managers should also consider PoS that
allows investors to delegate Staking rights to avoid SEC reporting
requirements.
Though the SEC and other regulatory agencies have not yet ruled on
Staking arrangements, Node Managers should be on alert. The sale of
unregistered investment contracts or engagement in fraud in violation of
the ‘33 Act may subject Node Managers to liabilities and other investor
remedies under state and federal securities laws, including private rights
of action and rescission.267 The SEC has already imposed fines on cryptos
deemed to be an offering of unregistered investment contracts.268 It is in
the best interest of Node Managers and blockchain developers alike to
264.
265.
266.

Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946).
See Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 558-60 (1982).
See Securities Act of 1933 § 4(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(2) (2012); 17 C.F.R. §
230.506(c) (2021). See also 17 C.F.R. § 230.251 (2018).
267. 15 U.S.C. § 77n; 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a). See generally Darren J. Sandler,
Rescission in the Age of Cryptocurrency, LAW360 (Sept. 25, 2017, 10:48 AM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/967108/rescission-in-the-age-of-cryptocurrency
[https://perma.cc/L53L-BW52].
268. Telegram to Return $1.2 Billion to Investors and Pay $18.5 Million Penalty to
Settle SEC Charges, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (June 26, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/
news/press-release/2020-146 [https://perma.cc/H5AW-N4BC].

2022]

DOES CRYPTOCURRENCY STAKING FALL
UNDER SEC JURISDICTION?

561

innovate out of SEC jurisdiction or comply with the reporting
requirements.

